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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
RULON BRERETON, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
vs. ) 
RALPH DIXON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 10,687 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
The respondent agrees with the appellant's statement 
of the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The respondent agrees with 1Jhe appellant's statement 
of the disposition in the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the verdict sustained. 
2 
STATEMENT 01' FACTS 
The respondent agrees in substance with the appel-
lant's statement of facts, but believes the following clarifi-
cations and corrections should be made: 
The orchard was a relatively new orchard that had 
just come into full production (R. 171, 173). It could be 
called a prime 011Chard lR. 146, 173) , and had no prior rec-
ord of earnings ( R. 17 4). The respondent was able to har-
vest the entire fruit crop with the help of his family (R. 
145), and could market his entire crop locally without the 
marketing expense incident to commercial operations (R. 
146). 
The respondent's orchard fit like the top of the "T" 
across the property of Provo City upon which the appellant 
was constructing the fire station. There was not any in-
tervening ground, except that part of the fire did burn land 
on the west side of Provo City's property on its way to the 
respondent's property, but in the main the fire went di-
rectly from Provo City's property to that of the respond-
ent. 
The fire burned 111 trees (R. 159); however, there is 
a conflict as to the amount of damage done to the pear 
trees. The respondent's experts sa:id they were totally de-
stroyed, and the appellant's expert disagreed in resped to 
the pear trees (R. 325). The respondent's experts agreed 
that there were 51 peach trees destroyed (R. 133). The 
appellant's e~rt did not count the damaged or destroyed 
peach trees (R. 324). Mr. Brereton and his experts claimed 
60 pear trees were also destroyed (R. 133, 142). 
The appellant states in his statement of facts that he 
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takes exception to the court's Instruction No. 21, but we 
are certain his complaint is to Instruction No. 20 (R. 144). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TIIE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVI-
DENCE AS TO THE VALUE OF TREES INDEPEN-
DENT OF THE LAND. 
It is respectfully submitted that Jury Instruction 
Forms, Utah, 90.40, is not necessarily designed to cover 
the particular damage issue of this case. It is further sub-
mitted that JIFU was never intended to cover all instruc-
tions essential to cover all legal propositions to be submit-
ted to juries. The authors and editor of the publication 
very candidly state in the preface of JIFU that the publi-
cation is intended as an aid to the court, and they do 
not purport it to be all inclusive. The respondent, there-
fore, takes issue with the appellant's conclusion concerning 
the application of JIFU recommended Instruction 90.40 as 
being appropriate to the issue. 
The damage issue in this case is one of first impression 
in Utah; however, we believe the case of Cleary v. Shand, 
48 Utah 640, 161 Pac. 453, states the Utah rule concerning 
proof that can be admitted related to the value of grow-
ing trees independent of the land. That case said: 
"But some courts have made exceptions to the general 
rule; and it is with reference to these that the dis-
agreements arise. One of them. is that, when the 
amount of damages is entirely de~andent upon a ques-
tion of value, many courts in different jurisdictions 
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have permitted qualified witnesses to give their direct 
opinion as to the amount of damages. 5 Ency. of Evi-
dence, 686. +++ ." 
The court in the Cleary case then went on to say they 
were inclined to follow the rule stated above but that the 
Cleary case was for other reasons not one to fit within the 
above stated rule (P. 643 oif 48 Utah). 
In the Cleary case the court also stated: 
"If the thing destroyed, although it is part of the realty, 
has a value which can be measured and ascertained 
without reference to the value of the soil in which it 
stands, or out of which it grows, the recovery must be 
for the value of the thing destroyed, and not for the 
difference in the value of the land before and after 
such destruction." (Emphasis added) 
While we believe the Cleary v. Shand case cited above 
was sufficient authority for the Court to admit opinion evi-
dence as to the value of the trees in place without reference 
to the value of the land; nevertheless, there is other sub-
stantial and modern authority for such procedure. This 
rule is stated in 22 Am.Jur. 2d. 208, Section 143: 
"Even this rule is not inflexible, however, (speaking of 
the general rule) and in a proper case the plaintiff can 
recover the value of the trees prior to the injury. Still 
other courts hold that damage caused by the destruc-
tion of fruit trees may be measured by estimating 
either their value as a distinct part of the land or the 
difference in value of the land before-and-after their de-
struction and that where both methods are resorted 
to in the same case, the damage must be ascertained 
by the jury from all of the evidence." 
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In another section under damages, to-wit: 22 Am. Jur. 
2d 427, Section 326, the authority states: 
"* * • If, however, that Which is destroyed or injured 
has a value which can be fairly and accurately meas-
ured without reference to the value of the land upon 
which it stands, the measure of damages being the 
value of such property or the cost of restoring or re-
placing it, the evidence regarding its value should re-
late to such actual value or cost of restoration. Thus, 
where standing forest timber is destroyed or injured 
evidenoe of the value of the timber itself is admissible. 
'*' * """ 
In 161 A.L.R. at 593, there is an entire annotation de-
voted to the value of trees as the measure of damage. At 
page 594 there is a section related to evidence of the value 
of trees as bearing upon lessened value of land. These cases 
indicate that the Court should and could consider the fair 
and reasonable value of the trees destroyed and not the 
di ff ere nee in the value of the land upon which they stood 
before and after the injury. This, in our judgment, is the 
better rule. 
The rule is again stated in 69 ALR 2d at page 1365. 
We contend that the rule is best expressed in the Windfohr 
v. John~on Estate case, 58 SW 2d 215, wherein the Court 
held that it was proper to charge the jury that the meas-
ure of damage was the value of the trees as they stood be~ 
fore the injury, rather than the difference in the market 
value of the land before and after the flooding. The court 
said: 
"The before-and-after measure of damage is not an in-
flexible rule but the measure of damages can be what-
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ever comes nearest to affording actual compensation 
for the injury. 0 *" 
Other cases adopting this rule are: \Vatkins v. 
Mountain Home Co-op. Irrigation Co., 33 Idaho 623, 197 p 
247; \\.indfohr v. Johnson Estate, 57 S\V 2d 215 (TexasJ. 
Loumille & N. R. Co. v. Beeler, 126 Ky 328, 103 SW 300; 
A. T. & F. R. Co. v. Geiser, 68 Kan. 281, 75 P 60; Reynolds 
v. Great Northern R. Co., 119 ~furn. 251, 138 ~\V 30; Hall 
, .. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 126 SC 330, 119 SE 910. 33 
ALR 292.) 
In llarion v. Nun (1942) 292 Ky. 251, 166 S\\. 2d 298 
the Court held that damage to fruit-bearing trees injured 
by fire was to be measured by "their reasonable value as 
growing trees upon the premises at the time of de::.-nuction; 
in other words, such a sum should be awarded as will fairly 
and reasonably compensate the O\\ner for being depriYed 
of the trees for their intended use: what they were worth 
on the premises in their growing state at the time of injWJ· 
or dest1uction.'' 
The appellant states he "took the liberty" on page 6 
of his brief to quote from Watkins , .. )fountain Home C-0-
op. Irrigation C-0., 33 Idaho 623. 19'7 P. 2-±7: hcwe\·er. he 
neglected to quote the preceding paragra~h wh:ch was to 
the effect that a farmer named Brau,,,crht who had long ex· 
perience \\ith trees was allowed to testify as to t.h€ rnlue 
of certain fruit and shade t:ree; in~pendent of the la.."'ld on 
which they stood. which is t.~e very pro~tion the appel· 
lant herein alleges is error. The paragraph GUOted by the 
appellant merely st:mds for the pro~t.on t:iat rnai.'1y fac· 
tors may be take.'1 into consideration in determ.in.:.r_g the 
ntlue of the tree:; "L'l a growing conditior~" 
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The respondent produced two expert witnesses, Vern 
A. Stratton and Clarence D. Ashton (R. 137, 210). Both 
hold graduate degrees in horticulture; both have taught 
thc:ir subjects at universities (R. 139, 21), both operated 
substantial fruit farms (R. 139, R. 356), both have writ-
ten p;:ofessional articles on the subject of fruit farming (R. 
_;_:J9. R. 212), and the latter was Extension Agent for Utah 
:'.)tate Agricultur2 College for 16 years (R. 211), Assistant 
County Agent for the Department of Agriculture in Utah 
County for 14 years (R. 211), and County Agent for Utah 
Cow1ty for 14 yars (R. 212). In addition, he taught at 
the University of Teheran for two years in the field of hor-
ticulture (R. 211) and is presently Professor in Horti-
cuiture at Brigham Young University (R. 211). Each of 
these experts inspected the orchard after the fire. These 
men both testified as to the value of the trees in question 
IR. 152, 224). 
The question is a great deal like the situation in the 
Idaho case, Watkins v. Mountain Horne Co-op. Irrigation 
Company, Ibid., wherein the neighbor f arrner was allowed 
to give his opinion based upon his knowledge of similar 
farms and conditions. Here the appellant's sole objection 
".eems to be directed to the method Mr. Stratton used to 
anive at his conclusion of value. While it may be that 
..\Ir. Stratton said that these trees had certain productive 
capacity (R. 201) he was not speculating as to what these 
tree>s would do but was basing his conclusions on . past ex-
pe1ience of similar trees under similar conditions. His en-
tire assumptions are based upon past ex--perience and not 
speculative guess work as urged by the appellant. Fur-
thermore, his testimony (Mr. Stratton's) goes only to the 
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weight of the evidence and there was other good and sub-
stantial evidence to support the judgment of the jury in 
the testimony of Mr. Brereton, who had been in the fruit 
business since he was old enough to tag along after his 
father. At the time of the trial he was 41 years old (R. 
49). There was the testimony of Professor Ashton con-
cerning value, and his testimony was never impeached or 
impaired. When the appellant says Professor Ashton could 
give no basis for his figures, he is merely stating that the 
appellant did not cross examine him concerning the basis 
of his conclusion (R. 224-230). 
The respondent respectfully submits that there was 
substantial evidence to support the conclusions of the wit-
nesses as to the value short of speculation, and there was 
by 1Jhe same token good and substantial evidence to sup-
port the jury's verdict. 
PO!Nf II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO'f ERRONEOUSLY IN-
STRUCT THE JURY. 
Instruction No. 20 given by the court states the 
holding of Cleary v. Shand (Ibid.) and uses almost the iden-
tical language of Marion v. Nun (1942) 292 Ky. 251, 166 
SW 2d 298. It is the opinion of the respondent that this 
is not error. 
CONCLUSION 
The same "interesting proposition" concerning value 
per acre raised by the appellant in his conclusion was raised 
by the appellant on cross examination (R. 192), to which 
the respondent agreed. Apparently the jury did not think 
fue value too disproportionate. The jury's conclusion is 
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probably based on the testimony of the respondent and the 
jury's view of the neighborhood, showing that Mr. Brereton 
lived in one of Provo's more attractive middle-class neigh-
borhoods and that his land could have been used for sub-
division or housing purposes, unless he had a better and 
higher use for the property. It is probably also based oo 
the simple fact and "interesting proposition" that those 
same trees would yield a net profit to Mr. Brereton of ap-
proximately $20.00 a year, a price which is $2,160.00 per 
year per acre or over a 10 year period $21,600.00 (R. 203). 
This, considered in light of the life expectancy of pear and 
peach trees of 75 years (R. 133) makes the jury's conclu-
sion even less surprising. It certainly explains why Mr. 
Brereton maintained his orchard rather than alter the use 
of his land. It also demonstrates the reasonableness of the 
verdict. 
The respondent W"ges this Court to affirm the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jackson B. Howard, for 
HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to 
Dallas Hi. Young, Jr., Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 48 
Nor1Jh University Ave., Provo, Utah, this day of 
December, 1966. 
Jackson B. Howard 
